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Johnson v. State, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 17 (June 14, 2007)1
 
CRIMINAL – ATTEMPTS TO UNLAWFULLY COMMUNICATE WITH A 
CHILD UNDER AGE 16 
 
Summary 
 
 Appellant Jeffrey Lee Johnson communicated via the Internet with several undercover 
law enforcement officers who he thought were 14-year-old girls.  Based on the nature of the 
conversations, Johnson was charged under the attempt provision of NRS 201.560.2  Johnson 
pleaded guilty to one count of violating NRS 201.560 and failed to file a direct appeal. 
 Johnson filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court, 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.  Johnson argued that his counsel was ineffective for 
not arguing that it was impossible for Johnson to violate the attempt provision of NRS 201.560 
because no actual child was ever involved in the communications.  Johnson also claimed 
ineffective assistance of counsel for allowing him to plead guilty with the availability of the 
aforementioned argument and that his counsel inadequately advised him regarding the 
consequences of lifetime supervision.  The district court denied Johnson’s post-conviction 
habeas corpus petition, holding that an individual can violate the attempt provision of NRS 
201.560 without the involvement of an actual child.   
Johnson appealed and the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal ruling that a violation of the attempt provision of NRS 201.560 occurs when the 
individual intends to communicate with a child.  The Nevada Supreme Court also ruled that 
Johnson’s counsel properly advised him regarding his guilty plea because the specific conditions 
of lifetime supervision are not determined at the time of sentencing. 
 
Issue and Disposition 
 
Issues 
 
1. Under NRS 201.560, does an individual violate the attempt provision when he or she 
intends to communicate with a child, but does not actually communicate with a child?  
2. Must an attorney advise a client regarding the specific consequences of lifetime 
supervision prior to the client’s guilty plea? 
 
 
                                                     
1 By Michael J. Gayan 
2 NRS 201.560 provides, in pertinent part: 
Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, a person shall not knowingly contact or 
communicate with or attempt to contact or communicate with a child who is less than 16 years of 
age and who is at least 5 years younger than the person with the intent to persuade, lure or 
transport the child away from his home or from any location known to his parent or guardian or 
other person legally responsible for the child to a place other than where the child is located[.] 
Disposition 
 
1. Yes.  A violation of the attempt provision of NRS 201.560 does not require 
communication with an actual child when the individual intends to communicate with 
a child. 
2. No.  An attorney does not need to advise a client about the specific consequences of 
lifetime supervision prior to the client’s guilty plea because the conditions are not set 
until just before the conclusion of the client’s term of imprisonment, parole, or 
probation. 
 
Commentary 
 
State of the Law Before Johnson 
 
 Prior to Johnson, the Supreme Court of Nevada specifically reserved the question of 
whether an actual child was required for a conviction of attempting to unlawfully communicate 
with a child under NRS 201.560.3   
 In Colosimo, the court held that a conviction for unlawful conduct with a child under 
NRS 201.560 required communication with an actual child and could not stand when the 
defendant actually communicated with an undercover law enforcement officer pretending to be a 
child.4  Colosimo had been charged with a completed violation of unlawfully contacting a child, 
thus, the court reserved the determination of the requirements for violating the attempt provision 
of NRS 201.560.5
 In Sharma, 6 the court reaffirmed the statutory definition of attempt, NRS 193.330(1), by 
explaining that “[a]n attempt crime is a specific intent crime; thus, the act constituting [the] 
attempt must be done with the intent to commit that crime.”7  The court previously upheld 
attempt convictions when the defendants intended to commit crimes but failed to succeed due to 
circumstances unknown to him.  In Darnell, 8 the court upheld a conviction for attempted 
possession of stolen property when the defendant intended to possess stolen property, but 
actually possessed property which had not been stolen.  Similarly, in Bell, 9 the court affirmed an 
attempt conviction when the defendant contacted an undercover law enforcement officer to 
procure a minor for sexual purposes even though no actual minor was ever at risk. 
 
 
 
                                                     
3 State v. Colosimo, 142 P.3d 352, 359 n.39 (Nev. 2006). 
4 Id. at 358-59. 
5 Id. at 359 n.39. 
6 Sharma v. State, 56 P.3d 868 (2002). 
7 Id. at 871 (quoting Tanksley v. State, 944 P.2d 240, 243 (Nev. 1997)). 
8 Darnell v. State, 558 P.2d 624 (Nev. 1976). 
9 Bell v. State, 775 P.2d 1273, 1274 (Nev. 1989). 
Other Jurisdictions 
 
 The court’s determination is consistent with holdings in other jurisdictions which have 
similarly held that an attempt conviction for communication with a child only requires intent to 
commit the underlying offense and does not require an actual child.10  For example, in Meek, 11 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted a Federal attempt provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b),  
which is similar to NRS 201.560, concluding that an attempt conviction was proper as long as 
the defendant believed he was communicating with a minor.12   
 
Effect of Johnson on Current Law 
 
 In Johnson, the court applied the attempt definitions from Darnell and Bell to the 
question of attempted communication with a child under NRS 201.560 which the court expressly 
reserved in Colosimo.  The court rejected Johnson’s appeal because Darnell and Bell clearly 
state that attempt convictions only require that the defendant intended to commit the crime.  
Therefore, Johnson’s conviction was proper because he pleaded guilty to attempting to contact 
children for the purpose of sexual conduct. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 To sustain a conviction for attempting to communicate with children for the purpose of 
sexual conduct, the State must only prove that the defendant intended to contact a person whom 
he believed was a child.  The fact that the defendant actually communicated with an adult, 
undercover law enforcement officer, does not preclude an attempt conviction under NRS 
201.560. 
 Johnson’s admission of attempting to communicate with a child for sexual purposes also 
prohibits any showing of ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney’s actions were 
not deficient and did not prejudice Johnson.  Moreover, Johnson’s counsel properly advised him 
regarding the ramifications of lifetime supervision.  
                                                     
10 People v. Cervi, 717 N.W.2d 356, 365 (Mich. App. 2006); Karwoski v. State, 867 So.2d 486, 489 (Fla. App. 
2004).
11 U.S. v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 2004). 
12 Id. at 718-19.  
